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From January 1997 to April 1999, we determined attack
rates for cases of invasive group A streptococcal (GAS) disease
in household contacts of index patients using data from Active
Bacterial Core Surveillance sites. Of 680 eligible index-patient
households, 525 (77.2%) were enrolled in surveillance. Of
1,514 household contacts surveyed, 127 (8.4%) sought medical
care, 24 (1.6%) required hospital care, and none died during the
30-day reference period. One confirmed GAS case in a house-
hold contact was reported (attack rate, 66.1/100,000 household
contacts). One household contact had severe GAS-compatible
illness without confirmed etiology. Our study suggests that sub-
sequent cases of invasive GAS disease can occur, albeit rarely.
The risk estimate from this study is important for developing rec-
ommendations on the use of chemoprophylaxis for household
contacts of persons with invasive GAS disease.
G
roup A streptococcus (GAS) causes a wide range of ill-
nesses from noninvasive disease such as pharyngitis and
pyoderma (1,2) to more severe invasive infections (e.g., bac-
teremia, pneumonia, and puerperal sepsis) (3,4). In the 1980s,
invasive GAS infections received increasing attention from the
medical community and the public because of necrotizing
fasciitis (NF) (5,6) and the emergence of streptococcal toxic
shock syndrome (STSS) (7–10). Based on results of the Active
Bacterial Core Surveillance (ABCs)/Emerging Infections
Program network, a population-based surveillance system, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates
that, in 1999, the annual invasive GAS incidence was 3.5 cases
per 100,000 population, yielding approximately 9,400 cases
and 1,200 deaths in the United States that year (11).
The severity of GAS disease, coupled with a number of case
clusters reported in communities and families (12–14) and sev-
eral anecdotal reports of subsequent cases of invasive GAS
infection in close contacts, causes concerns about the spread of
disease among close contacts and questions about whether
chemoprophylaxis to prevent illness in close contacts is war-
ranted. Using data from active surveillance in Ontario, Canada,
where the baseline rate of sporadic invasive GAS disease was
2.4 per 100,000 population (pers. comm.), investigators esti-
mated that the attack rate of disease among household contacts
of patients with invasive GAS disease was higher than the rate
of invasive disease among the general population (294.1/
100,000 population) (3).  
In October 1995, the Working Group on Prevention of
Invasive GAS Infections, composed of streptococcal experts
from a variety of clinical and public health organizations, CDC,
and various academic institutions, held a meeting to examine
existing data and to determine if these data were sufficient to
recommend widespread use of chemoprophylaxis to prevent
subsequent invasive GAS disease among close contacts of
index patients. Four specific criteria were used (15): severity of
disease (16–19), virulence of the strain (18,20–23), increased
risk for subsequent disease, and availability of an effective
chemoprophylaxis regimen. Both the severity of invasive GAS
disease and the virulence of GAS strains had been well docu-
mented. However, at that time, limited data existed regarding
the risk for subsequent GAS disease among household contacts
and an optimal regimen for chemoprophylaxis.
The working group concluded that a single study with four
case-pairs was inadequate for establishing national recommen-
dations for chemoprophylaxis for subsequent invasive GAS ill-
ness and emphasized the need for additional data on the risk of
subsequent GAS disease among household contacts (15). We
conducted surveillance to quantify the subsequent attack rates
for both confirmed invasive GAS disease and severe GAS-
compatible disease with no known etiology among household
contacts in four geographic areas in the United States.
Methods
Identification of Index Patients
Cases of invasive disease attributed to GAS were identified
through ABCs from January 1, 1997, to April 30, 1999. Active,
population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed GAS
infections occurred in four areas: the states of Connecticut and
Minnesota; the San Francisco Bay area, California (three coun-
ties); and Portland, Oregon, (three counties). The aggregate
population in 1998 was 12.1 million, or 4.5% of the U.S. pop-
ulation. 
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Streptococcus pyogenes in a surveillance area resident from a
normally sterile site (e.g., blood or cerebrospinal fluid) or from
a wound (when accompanied by STSS or NF). Surveillance
personnel reviewed records of all 208 clinical laboratories in
the participating ABCs areas every 6 months to verify comple-
tion of case ascertainment. All available sterile site isolates
were sent to CDC for confirmation and further microbiologic
testing (e.g., emm-typing) (24). 
AGAS index patient was defined as the person with the first
invasive GAS infection in a household. A nosocomial GAS
case was defined as a case-patient with a date of first positive
culture obtained >2 days after admission to hospital. An insti-
tutional GAS case was defined as a case-patient who resided in
a nursing home, jail, long-term skilled-care facility, or other
long-term care institution.
Identification of Eligible Households of Index Patients 
Surveillance personnel contacted the households of all
index patients to determine study eligibility. We restricted eli-
gibility to households of index patients with community-
acquired GAS infections. We excluded households of nosoco-
mial, institutionalized, and homeless GAS index patients in
addition to households of index patients who lived alone or
were without phones. To reduce the effect of recall bias, we
excluded households from which the case was not identified
within 120 days of the culture date. 
Collection of Information on Household Contacts
We defined a household contact as a person who regularly
spent 50% of nights or >24 h in a household with the index
patient during the week before the index patient’s date of cul-
ture. The index patients (or appropriate adult surrogates) of eli-
gible households were interviewed by telephone within 31 to
120 days after the index patient’s date of culture. Information
collected on all household contacts included age, gender,
underlying conditions, and relationship to the index patient.
Study personnel also identified all household contacts who had
sought medical care for any reason, been hospitalized, or died
during the reference period.
Surveillance personnel abstracted the medical charts of all
household contacts who had sought medical care, using a stan-
dardized data collection form to determine the types of visits,
chief complaints, diagnostic tests results, type and duration of
antibiotic use, and discharge diagnoses. All available sterile site
GAS isolates from household contacts were collected and sent
to CDC for confirmation and molecular testing.
We defined the study reference period as the 30 days after
the index patient’s date of GAS culture. A confirmed case of
subsequent invasive GAS disease was defined as isolation of
GAS from a household contact collected from a normally ster-
ile site (or from a wound when accompanied by NF or STSS)
within the study reference period. A probable case of subse-
quent severe disease was defined as a GAS-compatible illness
resulting in hypotension, hospitalization, or death within the
study reference period in a person from whom GAS was not
isolated and for whom other infectious causes of disease were
ruled out.
Analysis
Analysis was performed by using SAS software, version
6.12 (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC) and Epi Info, version 6.04c
(CDC, Atlanta, GA). Attack rates (number of subsequent cases
of invasive or severe GAS disease divided by number of house-
hold contacts, expressed as subsequent cases per 100,000
household contacts) were calculated for subsequent GAS dis-
ease among household contacts. We then compared the attack
rate using only confirmed subsequent cases of invasive GAS
disease to the sporadic incidence rate for invasive GAS disease
among the general population to determine the increase in risk
for subsequent GAS disease among household contacts. Exact
95% confidence intervals for the risk for subsequent GAS dis-
ease among household contacts were determined by using
binomial distribution.  
Results
During the study period, 1,063 index patients with invasive
GAS disease were identified, ranging in age from <1 year to 99
years (median, 48 years of age). The elderly (age >65 years of
age) accounted for nearly one third (31.4%) of the invasive
GAS cases. Most index patients had cellulitis with bacteremia
(36.8%) or bacteremia with no focal point of infection (25.9%).
Thirteen percent of the index patients had NF (6.5%), STSS
(4.6%), or both (2.0%). Diabetes mellitus and alcohol abuse
were the two most frequent medical conditions among patients
with invasive GAS disease. Less than 5% of the index patients
were infected with HIV.
Of the 1,063 households with index patients, 680 (64.0%)
were eligible for the study. Ineligible households included
those with index patients who had institutional infections
(n=106, 10.0%), lived alone (n=106, 10%), had no telephone
(n=42, 4.0%), or had nosocomial infections (n=37, 3.5%).
Fifty-two (4.9%) of the index patients were homeless. Some
households (n=36, 3.4%) were not eligible because the case
was identified >120 days after the culture date. Of the 680 eli-
gible index-patient households, 525 (77.2%) were enrolled.
Eligible households not enrolled included those that could not
be contacted (n=120, 17.6%) and those that refused to partici-
pate (n=24, 3.5%). Eleven households (1.6%) were not enrolled
because of other reasons, primarily language barriers.
From the 525 enrolled households, 1,514 household con-
tacts were identified and investigated (Table 1). Over half of
the contacts were female (54%). The age distribution among
the contacts was <93 years of age (median age, 29 years);
38.7% of contacts were children <18 years of age. Twelve per-
cent of the household contacts (n=181) reported antibiotic use
during the reference period. Approximately 9% (n=130) of the
household contacts reported at least one underlying medical
condition; the most common were chronic lung disease (3.0%)
and congestive heart failure (2.6%). 
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ical care or were hospitalized during the reference period. No
household contacts died during the reference period. Of the 127
household contacts who visited a physician, 104 (81.9%)
reported having symptoms; however, 23 (18.1%) were asymp-
tomatic at the time of their visit. Twenty of the asymptomatic
household contacts reported visiting the physician because a
family member had been ill with invasive GAS infection. Of
the 104 symptomatic household contacts, infectious illness was
diagnosed in 62 (59.6%). The diagnosis for most of these con-
tacts was based on clinical evidence of streptococcal pharyngi-
tis (n=10), obtained with a positive rapid strep test (n=36) or a
positive throat culture (n=5). Eight cutaneous infections, one
case of pneumonia documented by x-ray with no positive cul-
ture, and two clinically diagnosed cases of pneumonia were
diagnosed in contacts. Of the 23 asymptomatic household con-
tacts, 15 (65.2%) had evidence of GAS in the throat from a
rapid strep test (n=13) or positive throat culture (n=2). Twenty-
four household contacts required hospital care for various rea-
sons during the reference period (13 hospital admissions and 11
emergency room visits). 
During the study period, we identified one confirmed sub-
sequent case of invasive GAS disease and one probable subse-
quent severe GAS disease in household contacts (Table 2).
Both cases were diagnosed in immediate family members and
resulted in hospitalization. The index patient in the one con-
firmed case-pair was a 76-year-old woman who was hospital-
ized with cellulitis and had a positive blood culture for GAS.
The contact was her 69-year-old husband, who was hospital-
ized with cellulitis that progressed to NF 15 days after the
index patient’s culture date. A surgical specimen grew GAS,
but the isolate was not available for confirmation or further
testing by CDC. Both patients had underlying medical condi-
tions. 
The probable case-pair included an infant daughter and her
father. The index patient was a 2-month-old girl hospitalized
with GAS bacteremia with no focal point of infection. Her 39-
year-old father was hospitalized 19 days after his daughter’s
date of culture; he had erysipelas accompanied by fever and
hypotension (systolic blood pressure 86 mM Hg); a single blood
culture was negative for GAS. He was hospitalized for 2 days
and given intravenous antibiotics at home for 14 days. Neither
the infant nor her father had underlying medical conditions.
We compared the attack rates of subsequent GAS disease in
household contacts for this study to the Ontario, Canada, study
(3). The attack rate of our study, using only confirmed cases of
subsequent disease from ABCs, was 66.1 per 100,000 house-
hold contacts (95% confidence intervals [CI] 2 to 367). When
both confirmed and probable cases of subsequent disease were
used, the attack rate was 132.1 per 100,000 household contacts
(95% CI 16 to 476); an estimate that remains lower than that
measured among the Canadian study population.
Discussion 
During the 2-year study period in a population of 12.1 mil-
lion, we identified one confirmed subsequent case of invasive
GAS disease, resulting in an estimated risk of 66.1 per 100,000
household contacts. This attack rate represents an increased
risk for disease among household contacts of index patients
when compared to the annual incidence rate of sporadic inva-
sive GAS disease in the United States (average rate
3.5/100,000 population, 1995–1999) (16). Although the risk
estimate from this study is lower than the risk previously
reported from surveillance in Canada, both risk estimates have
extremely wide confidence intervals.
Our study has several strengths, including the large defined
population base in four geographically diverse regions in the
United States that participated in laboratory-based surveillance.
The methods and completeness of case ascertainment of inva-
sive infections for the ABCs system are well established. Also,
the charts of all household contacts who reported seeking med-
ical care during the 30-day reference period were reviewed for
invasive or severe GAS infections. 
The baseline rate of sporadic invasive GAS disease in this
U.S. study was higher than that observed in the Canadian pop-
ulation, while the risk for subsequent GAS disease was lower
than found in the Toronto study. Given the wide confidence
intervals, a comparison of the risk estimate of subsequent infec-
tions between the two studies is not warranted. Further compli-
cating a comparison of the studies are differences in physician
management and frequency of blood culturing, factors that may
affect the reported rate of sporadic invasive GAS disease. 
Our study was limited in the lack of information on the use
of chemoprophylaxis. We did not directly ask the household
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Table 1. Demographic and clinical features of household contacts of 
invasive group A streptococcus index patients
a 









c     
   0–4  177  11.9 
   5–17  398  26.7 
   18–34  324  21.7 
   35–49  290  19.5 
   50–64  157  10.5 
   >65  145  9.7 
Sex
d     
   Male  697  46 
   Female  810  54 
Underlying medical condition     
   Chronic lung disease  46  3.0 
   Congestive heart failure  39  2.6 
   Insulin-dependent diabetes  32  2.1 
   Cancer (except skin)  23  1.5 
   Other immunocompromising conditions
e  18  1.2 
   Liver disease  11  0.7 
   Chronic kidney disease  6  0.4 
aN=1,514.
 
bHousehold contacts are counted more than once if multiple conditions exist. 
cAge was missing for 23 household contacts. 
dSex was unknown for seven household contacts. 
eIncludes HIV infection, AIDS, intravenous drug use, chemotherapy for cancer, steroid 
use for other conditions such as recent organ transplant, or any illness from excessive 
use of alcohol. contacts or the physicians about the use of prophylactic antibi-
otics. Thus, we were unable to consistently determine the num-
ber of household contacts who received prophylactic antibi-
otics specifically for the prevention of GAS disease from their
physicians during the reference period. Another limitation of
the study is related to the reasons why household contacts
sought medical care. Although the chart abstraction form asked
about chief complaints, it did not specifically ask if the contacts
were asymptomatic and sought medical care simply because a
family member had been ill with invasive GAS. We were there-
fore unable to consistently differentiate between household
contacts who sought medical care for actual symptoms or ill-
ness from those who sought medical care simply because a
family member had been ill from GAS. 
Caution should be taken when defining the magnitude of
increased risk for subsequent invasive GAS disease to house-
hold contacts compared with the risk for invasive GAS disease
among the general population. The attack rates for confirmed
and probable severe GAS disease in household contacts from
this study are based on minuscule numbers (one and one,
respectively), resulting in estimates with extremely wide confi-
dence intervals. Even if the confirmed cases from this study
and the Canadian study were combined, the point estimate
would be based on five cases from 2,874 household contacts
observed over several years of surveillance, and the confidence
intervals would remain wide. Given that the combined popula-
tion and duration of both studies are 22.8 million persons and
4.5 years, a well-designed prospective study of sufficient dura-
tion and size would be necessary to achieve a risk estimate with
narrower confidence intervals and is likely not feasible.
Additionally, while both studies show an increase in risk for
subsequent disease among household contacts, directly com-
paring the risk to the incidence of primary invasive disease is
problematic (25). The attack rate of household contacts was
determined during a 30-day period as opposed to a year
because any risk for subsequent disease would likely be con-
centrated in the period shortly after the occurrence of the index
case in the household. We think the data are best interpreted as
additional evidence that household members are at higher risk
for invasive GAS disease during the month following the index
patient’s illness than are others in the population but that the
absolute risk for subsequent disease is low. 
Because of the small numbers of case-pairs, predicting who
is most likely to acquire a severe subsequent GAS infection is
difficult based on either this study or the Canadian study. All
five subsequent cases in the two reports occurred among adults
who were immediate family members, and all five occurred
within 3 weeks of the index patient’s date of culture. Although
we cannot predict who will acquire an invasive GAS infection
from a household member, multiple published studies have
identified those persons who are more likely to acquire spo-
radic invasive GAS infections that are unrelated to contact with
infected persons and those who are more likely to die from an
invasive infection. Groups at increased risk for sporadic disease
include those who have recently been infected with varicella-
zoster virus; have HIV infection, diabetes, cancer, or heart dis-
ease; are currently using high-dose steroids or intravenous
drugs; or are Native American. Persons >65 years of age are
more likely to die following an invasive GAS infection than
other age groups (3,10,11,16).  
This study provides important information for healthcare
practitioners and public health personnel to help guide their
responses to invasive GAS cases. The results of this study and
the Canadian study, the potential impact of chemoprophylaxis,
data on possible effectiveness of chemoprophylactic regimens,
and the overall epidemiology of invasive GAS infections were
recently reviewed by the Prevention of Invasive Group A
Streptococcal Infections Working Group. The group concluded
that although the risk for subsequent invasive GAS disease in
household contacts is higher than the risk among the general
population, routine administration of chemoprophylaxis to all
household contacts of persons with invasive disease is not rec-
ommended given the infrequency of these infections and the
lack of a known effective chemoprophylactic regimen (26).
Clinicians and public health professionals should inform
household members of persons with invasive GAS infections
about the early clinical manifestations of pharyngeal and inva-
sive GAS disease.
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Table 2. Confirmed and probable subsequent invasive group A streptococcus disease case-pairs, Active Bacterial Core Surveillance (ABCs)  
Case-pair 
status  Case status  ABCs area  Sex 
Age  
(in y)  Interval (d)  Diagnosis 
GAS culture 
results  Underlying condition  Hospitalized? 








Venous insufficiency  Yes 




Male  39  19  Erysipelas  Blood –  None  Yes 
aGAS, group A streptococcus; Active Bacterial Core Surveillance (ABCs); CA, California; CT, Connecticut; +, positive; –, negative; COPD, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; 
CHF, congestive heart failure. Ms. Robinson is an epidemiologist in the Office of Surveillance,
Office of the Director, National Center for Infectious Diseases,
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